By AfricaHeadline – June 2025
The panel moderated by Johnny Gas (Invest Africa) agreed on a sobering reality: despite partnership rhetoric, Africa remains a low priority in the second Trump administration’s foreign policy agenda.
AfricaHeadline Reports Team
editorial@africaheadline.com
Analysts noted that the continent accounts for only about 1% of total U.S. trade, and even within this modest figure, attention is concentrated on a few countries with critical mineral reserves. Aubry Ruby of the Atlantic Council emphasized, “Africa is not at the top of the agenda, but certain regions are becoming geopolitically vital.”
Cameron Hudson from CSIS stressed this selective attention creates a divide between “target states” and “forgotten nations,” marginalizing African countries outside mineral corridors or conflict zones.
For example, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is now a priority due to cobalt, while nations like Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone see drastically reduced engagement.
This inequality in U.S. attention calls for African leaders to rethink their economic diplomacy approaches.
Judy Moore from the Center for Global Development argued that the current phase of U.S. diplomacy is being driven more by domestic political interests than by global development needs. “Investment decisions, partnerships, or sanctions are increasingly reactive to the U.S. internal political landscape,” she noted. Programs like Power Africa and educational partnerships funded by USAID are already being affected.
The panel concluded that Africa must build collective bargaining platforms to enhance its political weight. The African Union is seen as a critical yet underutilized instrument. A fragmented response only reinforces the continent’s sidelining in U.S. strategic priorities.
A major point of concern was the negative impact of new U.S. tariffs on African exports. Since January 2025, textile products from countries like Lesotho, Madagascar, and Ethiopia have faced duties ranging from 12% to 20%, reversing years of gains under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). In Lesotho alone, over 12,000 jobs have been lost in the garment sector, affecting nearly 40% of the industrial workforce.
This regression threatens what many consider 25 years of commercial progress. Cameron Hudson called it “a self-inflicted wound,” damaging value chains that previously benefited both sides. Between January and April 2025, Sub-Saharan Africa’s textile exports to the U.S. dropped by 38%, representing over $480 million in losses.
Agricultural goods were also hit. Kenya’s tropical flower exports declined by 22% due to new phytosanitary requirements, imposed without notice. Uganda and Tanzania also reported losses in coffee exports facing new inspection regimes. These non-tariff barriers are viewed as indirect trade restrictions, violating World Trade Organization norms.
The panel urged a new U.S.-Africa trade pact adapted to post-AGOA realities. Without one, African fragmentation will grow, pushing desperate countries into unfavorable bilateral agreements.
USAID’s restructuring and the rise of the Development Finance Corporation (DFC) are radically changing the U.S. development finance model for Africa.
USAID has seen a 28% budget cut for Africa in 2025, with over 40 regional offices closed, affecting programs from child nutrition to women’s empowerment. The DFC is expanding, but with much stricter investment thresholds.
The DFC now prioritizes deals over $150 million and demands commercial-grade guarantees many African governments cannot provide. Just five countries, South Africa, Morocco, Nigeria, Egypt, and Senegal—have secured over 80% of DFC funding approved as of May 2025. Others, like Angola, Mozambique, and the DRC, are sidelined due to a lack of “project maturity.”
The DFC’s budget is increasingly being diverted to projects linked to U.S. national security, under Department of Defense authorizations. These include critical infrastructure projects—ports and railways—that connect directly to strategic mineral zones.
As a result, nations politically aligned with the U.S. benefit, while others face administrative bottlenecks.
To navigate this new environment, Aubry Ruby recommended African governments create “investment-ready project banks” with feasibility studies and international financial advisors. This, she said, is the only way to attract the increasingly selective and politicized flows of U.S. capital.
Strategically, the Trump administration has narrowed its focus to three core areas: counterterrorism in Somalia and the Sahel, control over the DRC, Zambia mineral corridor, and maritime security in the Red Sea. The recent $2.1 billion infrastructure deal in the DRC, backed by the U.S., Canada, and Japan, is a blueprint of this “securitized mineral diplomacy.”
The investment, which includes modernizing the Lobito Corridor rail line to Angola’s coast, aims to ensure secure access to cobalt and lithium for U.S. industries.
The logic is clear: protect resource flows and curb China’s growing influence. In exchange, the U.S. demands political alignment, especially in multilateral votes like those at the United Nations.
Hudson noted that this new approach “blends business, foreign policy, and security in ways we’ve never seen before.” Somalia is another example: while the U.S. has cut its diplomatic presence, it has ramped up drone operations and support to local militias. This militarization risks destabilizing fragile states and raises sovereignty concerns.
The panel warned that Africa risks becoming a pawn in the U.S.-China geopolitical chess game. To avoid this fate, African governments must negotiate harder for technology transfers, institutional support, and governance investments in return for resource access.
