The Berlin conference never really ended: Africa’s unfinished quest for economic sovereignty

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Opinion

On February 26, 1885, the Berlin Conference formally concluded. European powers left the German capital with maps, treaties and spheres of influence that would reshape Africa for generations. Not a single African leader participated in the discussions, the consequences remain visible today.

The borders drawn in Berlin fragmented historic kingdoms, separated ethnic communities and created political entities designed to serve imperial interests rather than indigenous realities. Yet to argue that Africa’s challenges are solely the consequence of colonialism would be both historically incomplete and strategically unhelpful.

The deeper question is whether the structures established during the colonial era merely evolved rather than disappeared.

More than six decades after the wave of African independence that swept across the continent between the late 1950s and mid-1970s, many African economies remain heavily dependent on external financing, commodity exports and foreign technological capabilities, political sovereignty was achieved, economic sovereignty remains a work in progress.

This was precisely the concern raised by Ghana’s founding president, Kwame Nkrumah, in his 1965 book Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism. Nkrumah argued that formal independence would have limited meaning if key economic decisions continued to be shaped by external actors, his warning remains relevant.

Africa accounts for nearly 18% of the world’s population and possesses approximately 30% of global mineral reserves, including vast deposits of cobalt, lithium, manganese, platinum, rare earth elements and copper. The continent also contains roughly 60% of the world’s uncultivated arable land. Yet Africa contributes less than 3% of global trade and less than 2% of global manufacturing output, the contrast is striking.

The Democratic Republic of Congo supplies a significant share of the world’s cobalt, Guinea holds some of the largest bauxite reserves on the planet, Zambia remains a major copper producer, Angola and Nigeria rank among Africa’s leading oil producers. Yet much of the value-added processing, industrial transformation and technological innovation associated with these resources occurs elsewhere.

Africa continues to export raw materials and import finished products, the result is a structural imbalance that has persisted across generations.

However, blaming external actors alone would ignore another reality. Many of Africa’s post-independence challenges have also been shaped by domestic governance failures, corruption, institutional weakness, political instability and inadequate investment in human capital. Berlin may have created the borders, but not every contemporary obstacle can be attributed to the decisions taken in 1885.

The challenge facing Africa today is therefore twofold: overcoming the historical legacy of external dependency while simultaneously addressing internal structural weaknesses, this challenge unfolds against an increasingly competitive geopolitical landscape.

Unlike the Cold War era, Africa is no longer influenced primarily by former colonial powers. The continent has become a strategic arena where the United States, China, the European Union, India, Turkey, Russia and Gulf states compete for influence, markets, critical minerals and strategic partnerships.

The question for African leaders is not whether to engage with these powers. Engagement is inevitable and necessary.

The real question is whether Africa can negotiate from a position of strength, this is where Pan-Africanism becomes more than an ideological aspiration. It becomes an economic necessity.

When Kwame Nkrumah called for African unity, he understood that fragmented markets would struggle to compete in an increasingly interconnected global economy. Today, that vision is reflected in the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which seeks to create the largest integrated market in the world by number of participating countries.

If successfully implemented, the AfCFTA could increase intra-African trade, strengthen regional value chains, accelerate industrialization and reduce dependence on external markets. More importantly, it could enhance Africa’s collective bargaining power in a world increasingly defined by economic blocs.

Countries such as Rwanda, Botswana, Mauritius and, increasingly, Angola demonstrate that progress is possible when institutional reforms, investment attraction and economic diversification are pursued consistently. Angola’s recent efforts to expand non-oil sectors, improve the investment climate and position itself as a regional logistics hub illustrate both the opportunities and the challenges facing African economies in the twenty-first century.

The struggle for Africa’s future is no longer a struggle against colonial administrations. It is a struggle for industrial capacity, technological innovation, financial independence and strategic autonomy.

The Berlin Conference ended in 1885. But its legacy survives whenever African economies remain dependent on decisions taken elsewhere, whenever the continent exports wealth without capturing value, and whenever its development priorities are shaped more by external interests than by African aspirations.

The next chapter of African history will not be written in Berlin, Brussels, Washington or Beijing, it will be written in Addis Ababa, Abuja, Luanda, Kigali, Nairobi, Accra and Johannesburg. Political independence liberated African states, economic sovereignty will liberate Africa itself.